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FAMILY BUSINESS GROWTH AROUND THE WORLD 
 
ABSTRACT 
Growth is important for the long-term success of a business. Regrettably, the impact of family 
influence on firm growth is largely neglected. We examine whether family firms have a higher 
growth rate than their non-family counterparts. Based on a large sample of firms across 43 
countries over a 10-year period, we show that family firms on average have higher growth rates 
than non-family firms, and this positive effect is greater for family firms operating in strong 
national institutional environments which are less corrupt, more democratic, more subject to rule 
of law, and have effective government policies. We also find that the positive effect of family 
influence on firm growth varies significantly across different types of family firms and different 
business cycles. These findings have important implications for theory and practice. 
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Financial returns and revenue growth are important aspects of firm success (Davidson, Delmar, & 
Wiklund, 2006). The former have been well-studied by scholars of family business in dozens of 
articles and several meta-analyses (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Chen, Hou, Li, Wilson, & Wu, 2014; 
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007; Wagner, Block, Miller, Schwens, & Xi, 2015). 
However, the literature on family firm growth is far less developed. According to a survey of over 
300 variables examined in empirical family business studies (Yu, Lumpkin, Sorenson, & Brigham, 
2012), growth has been very much neglected, and indeterminate as to its relationship with family 
influence (Evert, Martin, McLeod, & Payne, 2016). The common theoretical view is that family 
influence changes the strategic behavior of the family firm (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999), 
thereby affecting its growth.  However, the nature and magnitude of this influence remains unclear: 
specifically, whether family firms grow faster or slower than their non-family counterparts remains 
unknown. Empirical evidence on the topic would not only enrich our knowledge of family business 
behavior but also improve policy options. 
 In fact, vying perspectives of family firms surface conflicting views of family firm growth. 
One suggests that such firms will grow more slowly due to principal-principal agency costs (“the 
agency view”), as family members use their publicly traded firms for private benefit (Le Breton-
Miller & Miller, 2018; Pérez-González, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). This position is 
consistent with much of the literature on socioemotional wealth (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014; 
Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). In sharp contrast, 
“the long-term orientation view” suggests that families will invest generously in their firm and its 
growth due to the long-run benefits that will bring to their offspring, the firm, and its stakeholders 
(Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, 
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& Scholnick, 2008).  
 To shed light on family firm growth, we analyze the growth rates of 5,265 publicly traded 
firms from 43 countries in 33 industrial sectors from 2007 to 2016. Specifically, we examine 
whether family firms grow more – the long-term view, or less – the short-term agency view, than 
nonfamily firms, and also identify the institutional country-level governance indicators under 
which family firms can achieve superior growth. To that end, we develop a model of family firm 
growth and test it across different institutional environments. In so doing, we construct absolute 
and relative firm growth proxies using net sales and total assets to account for the diversity in 
growth measurements. We also adopt an overall index of country-level governance based on 
indicators from the World Bank, along with individual dimensions of this index to capture the 
heterogeneity of institutional environments around the world. To mitigate endogeneity and sample 
selection bias we exploit the longitudinal nature of our data and employ panel data and 2SLS 
estimators. We also examine variations of the family business effect on firm growth across 
different types of family firms, industries and over business cycles. In addition, a battery of 
robustness tests is performed to rule out possible alternative explanations for our findings. 
 We find that on average family firms exhibit a higher growth rate than non-family firms, 
thus supporting the long-term view. Moreover, a positive country-level institutional environment 
of democratic freedom, government effectiveness, corruption control and political stability 
significantly increases the positive effect of family influence on family firm growth. A family’s 
long-term perspective of its business and the superior growth funded by that orientation flourishes 
in positive institutional environments with less uncertainty that enables family economic and 
socioemotional priorities to be realized via the long-term performance of the business.  
 Furthermore, we find that the positive family business effect on firm growth applies mostly 
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to first-generation firms, regardless of whether the CEO is family member or not, as compared to 
non-family firms and later-generation family firms. Later-generation family firms can achieve 
above-average growth rates only if they have a professional CEO and operate in countries with 
good institutional environments. As to variations across industries, we do not find that industry 
context plays an important role. In particular, the positive effect of family influence on firm growth 
is present in both industries with low and high levels of market concentration. Finally, we 
document that the positive effect of family influence on firm growth does not hold in times of 
financial crisis for firms operating in countries with weak institutional environments. 
 This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, most studies have analyzed 
the financial returns of family firms. Growth is a key concern given the common view that family 
firms sacrifice growth in favor of family influence – a basis for much of the theorizing on this type 
of organization (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). The few studies of growth are cross-
sectional (Campopiano, Brumana, Minola, & Cassia, 2019; Lee, 2006; McConaughy & Phillips, 
1999), and have focused mainly on small and medium-sized entrepreneurial firms (Chen et al., 
2014; Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004). We arbitrate between and condition the application of key 
conceptual perspectives of family firms – principal-principal agency theory and the long-term 
orientation perspective (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005 2014; Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011). To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first longitudinal study supporting the long-term view of 
family business growth, employing panel data and instrumental variables (IV) estimators along 
with alternative variable definitions and a variety of control variables. In so doing, it opens an 
agenda for future research on the growth of firms with concentrated ownership. 
 Second, we identify institutional conditions around the world leading to the extraordinary 
growth of family firms. Where democracy, effective government, the rule of law and political 
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stability prevail, investing in the growth of the family firm is better able to achieve long-run 
economic and socioemotional family objectives than where institutional uncertainty abounds, and 
where extraction of private benefits is a superior family option, which in turn can retard firm 
growth (Amit, Ding, Villalonga, & Zhang, 2015; Peng & Jiang, 2010; Soleimanof, Rutherford, & 
Webb, 2017). Thus, our study reveals that the magnitude of the relationship between family 
influence and firm growth is dependent upon the institutional context, thereby bridging the family 
business growth literature with that on political and economic institutions. It also identifies 
variations of family business growth across different types of family firms, countries and business 
cycles, providing a novel understanding of the complexity of family business growth. 
 In the remainder of the paper we first present our theoretical arguments and hypotheses. 
Then, we describe our data and methods. Next, we discuss our main findings along with the results 
of post-hoc analyses and robustness checks. After that, we draw theoretical, managerial and policy 
implications from our study, also discussing limitations and future research avenues.  
 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES: AGENCY VS. LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVES  
We present two opposing sets of arguments concerning the growth of family firms drawn from 
two popular perspectives – namely agency and long-term orientation perspectives. We also 
reference the socioemotional wealth perspective as it surfaces mostly negative and sometimes 
positive aspects of family firms that tie in with both principal-principal agency and long-term 
orientation views (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2014). 
 
2.1 Stunted Growth: The Short-term, Principal-Principal Agency Perspective  
Although traditional agency theory posits low agency costs for owner-run businesses such as 
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family firms (Fama & Jensen, 1983), many studies suggest that these firms experience significant 
principal-principal agency costs, as family members, particularly in publicly traded firms, 
appropriate private benefits from the business (Chrisman et al., 2004; Muñoz-Bullón & Sanchez-
Bueno, 2011; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). This appropriation limits the resources available to the 
family firm to fund growth initiatives. 
 Bertrand and Schoar (2006) and Pérez-González (2006) suggest that private benefits may 
take the form of nepotism, favoritism, and entrenchment such that incompetent executives remain 
in their position despite poor results. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) agree, finding that compared 
to family firms, non-family firms are more likely to adopt modern management techniques to be 
more efficient and innovative. Also, family firms are said to employ less sophisticated financial 
management techniques, except when they have an outside director or a non-family member 
involved in financial decision-making (Filbeck & Lee, 2000). 
 Consistent with that view, the socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective argues that family 
firm owners will act to preserve their SEW endowment and resist taking risks that may jeopardize 
that (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2013; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Kotlar, Signori, De Massis, & Vismara, 
2018). Thus, they may ignore new business opportunities and innovate less if this threatens family 
control (Block, 2012; Gómez-Mejía, Makri, & Kintana, 2010; Patel & Chrisman, 2014). It has also 
been argued that family firms can lack effective management because family top executives are 
drawn from a smaller talent pool than in non-family firms (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Mehrotra, 
Morck, Shim, & Wiwattanakantang, 2013; Miller, Xu, & Mehrotra, 2014). Such executives may 
not have the skills to successfully orchestrate growth strategies.  
 Another growth resource that may be scarcer in family firms is capital. If family members 
wish to retain control of their firms, they will be less likely to incur debt (Mishra & McConaughy, 
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1999; Molly, Uhlaner, De Massis, & Laveren, in press), or to issue shares that dilute their control 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2009; Wu, Chua, & Chrisman, 2007).  Finally, family members may differ in 
their priorities (Kotlar & De Massis, 2013), resulting in conflicts that drain the firm of resources 
required for growth.  
 
2.2 Superior Growth: The Long-Term Perspective  
The long-term perspective presents an opposite point of view of the growth potential of family 
firms (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; 2014). In reviewing the literature, Villalonga, Amit, 
Trujillo, and Guzmán (2015) highlight several studies that employ the long-term perspective 
(Block & Henkel, 2010; Brigham, Lumpkin, Payne, & Zachary, 2013; Lumpkin & Brigham Keith, 
2011) to understand family firms. Kappes and Schmid (2013) suggest that family firm managers 
have long time horizons for their business because they wish to preserve it for the family and its 
later generations. They avoid short-term expedients to grow profits and generously invest in the 
future of their companies. In other words, they promote conditions favoring long-term growth over 
short-term profits, thereby avoiding a “quarterly earnings mentality”.  
As the family legacy and the well-being of subsequent generations may be tied to the 
robustness of the business, some family members are keen to ensure firm continuity. They may do 
so by investing in the future of the business, strengthening relationships with employees via 
assiduous training and superior working conditions (De Massis, Audretsch, Uhlaner & 
Kammerlander, 2018; Reid, Dunn, Cromie, & Adams, 1999), and building long-term, flexible 
relational connections with outside stakeholders such as suppliers and customers (Orth & Green, 
2009). They also may generously invest in renewing the business via new product offerings and 
market extensions (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2007).  
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Assiduous pursuit of a long-term orientation also leads to the accumulation of unique 
resources. Habbershon and Williams (1999) highlight access to family financial capital, cheap and 
loyal family labor, a motivated and stable management team, and social capital in the form of 
relationships with the community, including government institutions (Arregle et al., 2007). Due to 
their concern for the family’s reputation, some family firms also have an incentive to promote and 
sustain family-branded products (Craig, Dibrell, & Davis, 2008). In addition, in view of the relative 
stability and authority of family governance, family firms can form enduring relationships with 
other family businesses to promote joint commercial interests (Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Lester, 
2010; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Salvato & Melin, 2008). And thanks to their discretion 
and independence from short-term pressures from public shareholders (Ali, Chen, & 
Radhakrishnan, 2007), family executives are able to make bold decisions to adapt to new 
conditions when the environment changes or when important new growth opportunities arise 
(Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 2004). Finally, given their extended investment horizons (Kappes & 
Schmid, 2013), owners are more likely to eschew opportunism (Blair & Stout, 2006) to embrace 
a more growth oriented culture.  
 
2.3 Stunted growth vs. Superior growth 
Clearly, the principal-principal agency and long-term views lead to opposite conclusions regarding 
family firm growth. And the empirical findings to date do not help to resolve this debate. For 
example whereas the cross-sectional analysis of S&P 500 firms by Lee (2006) reveals that family 
firms on average exhibit higher growth rates than non-family firms, larger cross-sectional studies 
of family firms from 35 countries by Campopiano et al. (2019) and of entrepreneurial firms from 
80 countries by Chen et al. (2014) report a negative effect of family influence. In other words, “the 
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jury is still out”. That being said, the firm growth literature suggests that high growth is largely a 
result of long-term investments in innovation and enduring relationships with employees, clients, 
suppliers, or the community (Del Monte & Papagni, 2003; García-Manjón & Romero-Merino, 
2012; Unger, Rauch, Frese, & Rosenbusch, 2011). Firms that consistently invest in innovation 
experience higher growth by introducing new products, services and business models (Geroski & 
Machin, 1992; Yasuda, 2005). Similarly, people-related investments boost employee motivation, 
engagement and productivity (Bakker & Schaufeli, 2008; Oswald, Proto, & Sgroi, 2015) and create 
strong organizational identities (Dorrenbacher, Tomenendal, & Stanske, 2017), thereby boosting 
growth (Goedhuys & Sleuwaegen, 2016; Grover Goswami, Medvedev, & Olafsen, 2019).  
 Family firms are also said by some to excel in such long-term investments in innovation 
vis-a-vis non-family firms (Bergfeld & Weber, 2011; Kappes & Schmid, 2013). Moreover, they 
may produce more innovation output than others (De Massis, Frattini, Pizzurno, & Cassia, 2015; 
Duran, Kammerlander, Van Essen, & Zellweger, 2016). Family firms also invest more in human 
capital in the form of union relations, employee involvement and protection, retirement benefits, 
cash profit sharing, health and safety than non-family firms (Kang & Kim, 2019; Sanchez‐Bueno, 
Muñoz‐Bullón, & Galan, 2019). Moreover, they are known for investing in superior relationships 
with clients, suppliers and community (Baù, Chirico, Pittino, Backman, & Klaesson, 2018; Lamb 
& Butler, 2016; Le Breton-Miller et al., 2010). Thus, we argue that many family firms, thanks to 
their long-term orientation regarding superior innovation- and employee-related investments, are 
more likely to achieve a higher growth rate than their non-family counterparts.  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Family firms exhibit a higher growth rate than non-family firms. 
 
2.4 The role of institutional environments 
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Whereas H1 predicts a positive impact of family influence on firm growth, the institutional 
environment may have an important moderating effect. This is in line with prior research that has 
emphasized the theoretical and practical importance of institutional environments for family firm 
decision-making processes (Ahuja, Capron, Lenox, & Yao, 2018; Banalieva, Eddleston, & 
Zellweger, 2014; North, 1990; Peng & Jiang, 2010). 
Specific conditions in the macro institutional environment may contribute to family firm 
growth. Country-level governance dimensions such as democratic freedom, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, corruption control and political stability may have a 
profound effect on family firm growth – a core distinguishing priority of family firms (e.g. Miller 
& Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011)  – because they influence the degree to 
which family owners and executives can embrace their natural  long-term orientation toward their 
companies. Specifically, we shall argue that in the normal course, families want their companies 
to serve as vehicles for the long-term economic, vocational and social benefits of family members. 
This will induce them to invest generously in their business, its people and its products to build a 
promising future for the family inside the business (Kappes & Schmid, 2013; Miller & Le Breton-
Miller, 2005). That can augur well for extraordinary family firm growth and give them a natural 
advantage over their non-family counterparts. However, where democratic institutions, 
government effectiveness, the rule of law, and political conditions are weak, an uncertain 
environment prevails. This makes it less possible for families to follow their natural long-term 
orientation for their business, which faces abundant risks within such contexts (Kao, 1993). 
Instead, they are more likely to fulfill family objectives by taking resources out of the business, 
tunneling, and building a family nest-egg separate from their companies (Morck & Yeung, 2003; 
Morck & Yeung, 2004), thereby decreasing the growth rate of family firms. 
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In the discussion that follows, we propose the effects of each of these country-level governance 
dimensions.  
Democratic Institutions: Democratic countries around the world experience more 
economic growth in part by encouraging investment, fostering economic vitality, and avoiding 
social unrest. According to Acemoğlu, Naidu, Restepo, and Robinson's (in press) analysis of 175 
countries over 50 years, democracy increases GDP per capita by about 20 percent. Similarly, 
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) find a significant positive effect of democratization on annual 
per capita growth. In a democratic economy, family firms are likely to have the confidence to 
invest generously in growing their businesses, particularly given their long-term perspective of 
ensuring a promising future for offspring and a developing family (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 
2006; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2007). In other words, unless family firms are dissuaded 
by adverse political conditions, they will tend to invest more than their non-family counterparts in 
firm growth and renewal (Miller et al., 2008). By contrast, where economies are less democratic, 
the resulting uncertainty of long-term investment in the business may induce family owners and 
executives to take money out of their companies in order to secure the financial future of the family 
– perhaps by extracting private benefits (Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005). Diversifying 
personal wealth, perhaps even by taking funds out of the country, will be seen as a superior option 
(Harrington, 2016), thereby retarding the growth of the family firm. 
Government Effectiveness: Another important feature of the country-level institutional 
context is government effectiveness. There are major international variations in the effectiveness 
of governmental fiscal and social policies, which can either enhance or obstruct relationships 
between the state, corporations, and other stakeholders (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Countries with 
more effective civic and economic policies, and long-term government policy commitments, are 
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more likely to induce families to invest in their companies (Crouzet, 1999). Again, given the long-
term orientation of family firm owners and managers, propitious institutional conditions will 
induce them to invest in a business to which a family’s economic, career, and social futures are 
attached (Kappes & Schmid, 2013; Miller et al., 2008). Indeed, such long term orientation enables 
family firms to build trust-based and stable networks (De Massis et al., 2018; Gudmundson, 
Hartman, & Tower, 2004), which may lead to enduring long-term relationships with far-sighted 
and effective governments.  
 Regulatory Policy and Rule of Law. A vast literature establishes that countries vary 
greatly in their ability to pass sound laws and guarantee shareholder protection (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2013). An analysis of 39 countries by Dyck and Zingales (2004) finds that 
country-level institutions such as protection of minority shareholders and better law enforcement 
reduce the private benefits of control. A strong legal environment limits family firm owners’ ability 
to extract private benefits and expropriate minority shareholders, making investment in the firm 
more likely (Gale & Scholz, 1994). Indeed, the negative effects on firm value of having a family 
CEO in Asian listed companies were mitigated by effective national legal and regulatory 
institutions (Peng & Jiang, 2010). 
Furthermore, countries with better legal environments have more developed capital 
markets (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000) and financial intermediaries 
(Levine, Loayza, & Beck, 2000) because they promote better monitoring and reduce information 
asymmetries between managers and investors (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & Servaes, 2003; Giannetti, 
2003). In such contexts, family firms will be more able to pursue their natural inclination towards 
superior growth. 
Freedom from Corruption: Corporations often must negotiate, lobby, and interact with 
 13 
 
public officials to access resources and ensure a positive economic environment. When there is 
corruption in a country, there is more opportunity for public officials and firms to engage in 
nefarious bribes and embezzlement. According to Krueger (1974) and Murphy, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1993), such corruption diverts financial resources away from investments in physical 
assets, innovation, and expansion, into the pockets of rent-seeking politicians and perhaps those of 
owning families’ personal finances rather than their firms. This hampers economic and company 
growth (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011).  
Studies have shown that family firms are more socially responsible and ethical than their 
non-family counterparts (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010; Dyer & 
Whetten David, 2006; O'Boyle, Rutherford, & Pollack, 2010), in part because they wish to 
preserve a positive family image and reputation across generations (Cennamo, Berrone, Cruz, & 
Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Craig et al., 2008). Again, this is consistent with the long-term orientation of 
many family firms. In a corrupt environment, such ethical family firms may struggle to obtain the 
resources needed to grow in the face of rent-seeking public officials, or benefit from corruption by 
extracting private benefits (Kao, 1993) thereby decreasing their growth rate. In a less corrupt 
country, family firms are freed from such resource constraints and, thus, can access more resources 
and speed the growth they value for the long-term success of the family and its generations. 
 Political Stability and Absence of Terrorism: Political stability is an important prerequisite 
of the well-functioning business society (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009). Given that long-
established family firms have prospered in Europe (Barontini & Caprio, 2006), Asia (Chen, Firth, 
Gao, & Rui, 2006), the U.S. (La Porta, Lopez‐De‐Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999) and elsewhere, and 
often have strong connections with local governments (Ciravegna, Kano, Rattalino, & Verbeke, 
2019), political instability or violence can hamper their growth. According to European Family 
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Business and KPMG (2016), political instability is frequently mentioned by family firms as one of 
their biggest challenges for growth. There is also evidence that given their long-term orientation, 
some family firms find it hard to re-establish connections with new governmental authorities when 
there are sudden shifts in political power (Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). Therefore, in unstable 
political contexts family firms may be less able to pursue their ambitious growth objectives. 
To summarize, countries with democratic institutions, government effectiveness, the rule 
of law and political stability can be said to benefit from strong, that is stable and promising, 
political and economic environments. There, the long-term orientation of many family firms will 
induce them to invest in their companies to achieve superior growth. Conversely, they are likely 
to grow more slowly in unstable institutional environments, where politics and economics are 
uncertain, costs of doing business are high, and where it is safer for family owners to extract private 
benefits rather than invest in their companies’ growth. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The positive effect of family influence on firm growth will be greater in 





To examine the relationship between family influence and firm growth, we constructed a 
worldwide sample of publicly traded firms. We employ the NRG Metrics database’s Family Firms 
dataset. This dataset is created by a team of expert analysts who manually enter, review, and cross 
check data with senior analysts, who perform frequent random audits. NRG Metrics sources 
publicly available documents such as annual reports, corporate governance reports, firm 
presentations, SEC filings, and press releases. Customized software programs verify all levels of 
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data entry for inconsistencies and errors using a combination of quality control measures (NRG 
documents).  
The dataset covers 7,000 publicly-traded (active and non-active) firms from America, 
Europe, Asia and Africa beginning in fiscal year 2007. All financial firms were excluded following 
common practice (Barontini & Bozzi, 2018). We collected financial and accounting firm-level 
data from Thomson-Reuters Datastream. Country-level macroeconomic data were taken from the 
World Bank (see below). In total, our final sample comprises 5,265 publicly-traded manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing firms from 43 countries covering the period 2007 to 2016, inclusive.   
Three types of publicly traded companies are present in our dataset: 1) companies in the 
dataset for the entire period of analysis (51.62%); 2) companies that enter the sample during the 
period (36.14%); 3) companies that exit during the period (12.24%) because they become privately 
held, merged, liquidated or inactive. This data structure enables us to mitigate survivorship bias 
(Elton, Gruber, & Blake, 1996).  
Tables 1 shows the composition of our sample by family control and industry. The largest 
portion of publicly traded firms in our sample cover Anglo-Saxon (Australia, Canada, UK, US and 
New Zealand) and European countries, amounting to 43% and 39% of the sample. Asian countries 
represent 12.5% of the sample, and 5.5% are other countries. The largest fraction of family firms, 
22%, come from the US. 
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE 
Tables 2 shows the composition of our sample by family control and industrial sector 
(three-digit ICB codes). Over half of the sample are in industrial, consumer goods and consumer 
services sectors (57%), while the rest fall into the basic materials, health care, oil and gas, 
technology and communications and utilities sectors. Family control is a common characteristic 
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of firms belonging to a broad array of manufacturing industries in our sample, the average is 
around 33% of all firms. We observe the most family firms in industrials, consumer goods and 
services (around 27%, 18% and 18%, respectively) and the fewest in utilities and 
telecommunications (1.79% and 1.66%, respectively). 
 
3.2 Measures 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
Several measures of firm growth appear in the literature: sales, total assets, profitability ratio, 
employment, and value added (Audretsch, Coad, & Segarra, 2014; Reuber & Fischer, 2002). 
Davidson et al. (2006) argue that sales growth is the more appropriate proxy of firm growth as it 
is less subject to accounting manipulations and short-term market reactions. We measure firm 
growth as the log-difference of net sales for company i from country c between time t and t-1 
(García-Manjón & Romero-Merino, 2012; Rahaman, 2011). Adoption of the two-year and three-
year firm growth rates did not alter our results.  
 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
 Many studies operationalize a family firm by  the ownership stake of the controlling family 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999). 
Others use family management (Sciascia, Mazzola, & Chirico, 2013; Zahra, Neubaum, & 
Larrañeta, 2007). And still others require a substantial ownership stake and as well as managerial 
presence (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Chua et al., 1999; Kotlar, Fang, De Massis, & Frattini, 2014; 
Kotlar et al., 2018). Accordingly, our Family variable captures fractional equity ownership of the 
founding family and/or the presence of family members serving on the board of directors. It is 
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coded as a dummy that equals 1 if a founder, descendant or family member is a director or large 
shareholder (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a, 2003b)i. Family firms represent around 33% of our sample, 
which is in line with prior studies of listed firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga & Amit, 
2006). 
To assess country-level institutional environments, we adopted the World Governance 
Indicators (WGIs) that capture the process by which governments are selected, monitored, and 
replaced, government capacity to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and the 
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern their economic and social 
interactions. Specifically, we focused on the following WGIs in this study: Democratic freedom, 
Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, Corruption control, Political stability 
and Absence of terrorism (Political Stability) (see Table 3 for details). These indicators are based 
on over 30 individual data sources produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, NGOs, 
international organizations, and private sector firms (Kaufmann et al., 2011). These WGIs have 
been validated in prior literature by both management (Chen et al., 2014) and corporate governance 
scholars (Ding, Qu, & Wu, 2016). 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Individual WGIs exhibit relatively high correlations (ranging from 0.67 to 0.96), 
suggesting that even though these dimensions reflect different dimensions of the country-level 
institutional environment, they are highly correlated. Therefore, we used Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) to derive an overall WGI proxy of the institutional environment. Specifically, the 
PCA produced a linear combination of all the components of WGI with the highest variance. The 




3.2.3 Control variables  
We controlled for both micro-level variables (financial leverage ratio, cash flow ratio, R&D, firm 
age and firm size) and macro-level variables (GDP growth, trade, and inflation) in our explanatory 
model. Following prior studies (Huynh & Petrunia, 2010), Financial leverage is included as a 
measure of debt, and Cash flow reflects internal finances (Brown & Petersen, 2009). We calculated 
financial leverage as total debt to total assets, and cash flow as net income and non-cash charges 
to total assets (Testa, Miroshnychenko, Barontini, & Frey, 2018). R&D was computed as R&D 
expenses to net sales to proxy for innovation (Audretsch et al., 2014). As missing R&D 
observations are common (Koh & Reeb, 2015), this data existed for only 34% of our sample; thus 
following O’Connor and Rafferty (2012), all missing R&D values were scored as zero.  
Numerous studies suggest that larger and older companies grow more slowly than their 
smaller and younger counterparts (Hardwick & Adams, 2002; Oliveira & Fortunato, 2006; Yasuda, 
2005). Therefore, following Hardwick and Adams (2002); Huynh and Petrunia (2010) Firm size 
(logarithm of total assets) and Firm age (logarithm of numbers of years the firm exist) are added 
to our explanatory model. Moreover, as firms grow faster in open and expanding economies 
(Acemoğlu et al., in press; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, & Levine, 2008), we controlled for 
GDP growth (calculated as the annual percentage growth rate of real GDP)ii and Trade proxies 
(calculated as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services of a country as a share of 
GDP) (Allen, Qian, & Qian, 2005). We also incorporated the Inflation rate to control for price 
dynamics (Apergis, 2004), and industry (three-digit ICB codes) and year dummies to account for 
industrial differences and business cycles (Bozzi, Barontini, & Miroshnychenko, 2017). It is 
important to note that firm-level fixed effects could not be employed as family firm status rarely 




4. ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
4.1 Empirical model 
The explanatory model used to examine the impact of family influence on firm growth is as 
follows: 
Growthic, t = β0 + β1(Familyic, t) + β2(Controlsic, t) + ii + dt + εic, t  (1) 
where i refers to firms, c refers to countries, t refers to years, Familyic, t represents proxy of 
family influence, Controlsic, t is a vector of control variables (Firm size ic, t, Firm age ic, t, R&D ic, t, 
Financial leverage ic, t, Cash flowic, t, GDP growthc, t, Tradec, t, Inflationc, t), ii stands for industry fixed 
effects (three-digit ICB codes), dt represents year fixed effects, and εic,t is an error term.  
 To check the moderating effect of the WGIc,t on the association between family influence 
and firm growth, we added the WGIc,t and its interaction term with Familyic, t  to our equation (1). 
WGIc,t was mean-centered in the interaction to increase interpretability of estimates (Afshartous & 
Preston, 2011).  Thus, our basic model (1) can be re-written as: 
Growthic, t = β0 + β1(Familyic, t) + β2(WGIc, t) + β3(Familyic, t  x WGIc, t) + β4(Controlsic, t) + ii + dt + εic, t (2) 
 where the coefficient of WGIc,t captures the effect of average country-level institutional 
environment on firm growth for the reference group (non-family firms). The Familyic,t dummy 
reflects the family business effect on firm growth for firms operating in countries with average 
country-level institutional environment. The interaction term Familyic x WGIc, t shows how family 
business growth varies as the average country-level institutional environment improves. 
 The results of the Durbin-Watson and Wu-Hausman tests show that Firm sizeic,t, R&Dic,t 
and Cash flowic,t variables from our explanatory model did not meet the exogeneity assumption 
iii. 
To address this problem, we adopted a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator (Rose & Stone, 
2011). In the first stage, we regress the endogenous variables (Firm sizeic,t, R&Dic,t and Cash 
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flowic,t) on all the exogenous variables (Familyic, t, Financial leverageic, t, GDP growthc, t, Tradec, t, 
Inflationc, t, Industry and Time dummies) and the instrumented variables (IVs) to remove the 
proportion of these variables correlated with the error term. Due to an absence of strong external 
IVs in the literature, we adopted first- and second-year lagged values of Cash Flowic,t and second-
year lagged values of Firm sizeic,t and R&Dic,t (Krafft, Qu, Quatraro, & Ravix, 2013). In the second 
stage, the predicted values of the endogenous variables are used to estimate the explanatory 
variables (Firm sizeic,t, R&Dic,t and Cash flowic,t). To confirm the strength of our IVs (their 
correlation with endogenous regressors) and their validity (their orthogonality to the error term), 
we conducted both Kleibergen-Paap and Hansen tests. All the 2SLS regressions were estimated 
using the ivreg2 command in Stata (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2003) (see Table 8). 
 We used robust standard errors clustered at the firm level  to relax homoscedasticity and 
autocorrelation assumptions Petersen (2009). In addition, to test the joint significance of the 
reported coefficients, industry dummies, and year dummies, we employed three Wald tests using 
the testparm command in Stata.  
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics, univariate tests and correlation matrix 
Table 4 displays descriptive statistics. Our firms exhibit significant variability in growth rates,  
averaging 0.047, with standard deviation 0.336.  Institutional development also varies substantially 
across countries, as shown in Table 5. Finland, Denmark and Sweden enjoy the best institutional 
environment, while Russia, Indonesia and the Philippines have the worst.   
INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 HERE 
 
 Univariate analyses displayed in Panel A of Table 6 shows that family firms exhibit a 
higher annual growth rate than their non-family counterparts (p<0.001). This result also holds for 
two- and three-year growth rates (p<0.001), suggesting that family firm superior growth persists 
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for years.  
 Panel B of Table 6 shows growth rates by geography. Family firms from Anglo-Saxon or 
Asian countries – leading economic superpowers - have higher growth rates than non-family firms 
(p<0.001). Also family firms from Asian countries, including the “Asian Tigers” of Singapore, 
Hong-Kong and South Korea, have significantly higher growth rates over one- (p<0.001), two- 
(p<0.001) and three-year periods (p<0.001) than family firms from Anglo-Saxon countries, likely 
due to the extraordinary growth of the Asian economies (Fontana & Srivastava, 2009; Gulati, 
1992). 
INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7 HERE 
 
 Table 7 presents the correlation matrix. We find that family firm status and firm growth are 
positively correlated (p < 0.001). Also, firm growth is negatively correlated with firm size, firm 
age and financial leverage (p < 0.001), while cash flow is positively correlated with firm growth 
(p < 0.001). Variance inflation factors (VIF) were never exceeded 4 (O'Brien, 2007), suggesting 
that multicollinearity was not a concern.  
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Main results 
Table 8 presents the 2SLS estimates of the relationship between family influence and firm growth. 
Model 1 includes our main variable of interest, the Family dummy, while Models 2 adds WGI, our 
proxy for institutional environment, Model 3 adds the interaction between Family and WGIc and 
Models 4-9 report the results for all the individual dimensions of WGIc. 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
H1 predicts that family influence positively affects firm growth. In Table 8, the Family 
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dummy is statistically significant, indicating that the average growth rate of family firms is in fact 
significantly higher than for non-family firms (Model 1: β = 0.013, p < 0.01). In contrast to private 
family firms that do not differ in growth from their non-family counterparts (Chrisman et al., 
2004), our publicly-traded family firms have, on average, a 1% higher growth rate than their non-
family counterparts. Our finding also contrasts with prior cross-sectional studies on family firm 
growth by Lee (2006) and Campopiano et al. (2019), very likely because our panel data allow us 
to obtain more accurate estimates of model parameters by observing growth rates over a longer 
period and covering different stages of the business cycle and of firm development (Evert et al., 
2016). In addition, our identification strategy reduces endogeneity concerns via strong and valid 
IVs (Rose & Stone, 2011), as confirmed by both Kleibergen-Paap and Hansen tests, and it also 
mitigates survivorship bias (Elton et al., 1996).  
Model 2 of Table 8 assesses the effect of institutional development on firm growth. The 
coefficient of WGI is positive and highly significant (β = 0.011; p<0.001) suggesting that firms in 
countries with strong institutional development, on average, grow faster than firms from countries 
with weak institutional development, confirming the role of national institutions in boosting firm 
growth. In addition, after accounting for country-level institutional development, the Family 
coefficient increases in economic and statistical significance (β = 0.017; p<0.001).  
Model 3 indicates that the Family coefficient remains positive and statistically significant 
after incorporating the interaction between family influence and institutional development  
(β=0.019; p<0.001). The interaction between Family and WGI is also positive and significant 
(β=0.015; p<0.01). Holding all other variables constant, we calculated the economic impact of our 
regression estimates for family firms from countries with institutional development above the 
sample average: (0.019 + 0.015)*100 = 3.4% (statistically significant at the 1% level). Thus, the 
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positive effect of family control on firm growth is greater in countries with superior institutional 
environments (3.4%) than in countries with average institutional environments (1.9%). This 
finding is confirmed in all other specifications of Table 8 (Models 4-9), with individual WGIs 
(Democratic Freedom, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Corruption 
Control and Political Stability) as dependent variables, and all firm-, industry- and country-level 
controls. Thus, our empirical evidence robustly supports H2. It is also important to mention that 
family firms grow more in average institutional environments (β=0.019; p<0.001) and in superior 
institutional environments (β=0.034; p<0.001), as compared to their nonfamily counterparts 
(β=0.005; p<0.186). Wald tests of the joint significance of industry and time dummies are 
statistically at the 1% level in all models, justifying their incorporation in our explanatory model. 
To summarize, family firms have higher growth rates than non-family firms, thus 
supporting the long-term view of family firms.  Moreover, this positive effect is greater in countries 
with strong national institutional environments, again in line with the long-term perspective of 
family business. 
 
5.2 Post-hoc analysis  
Thus far we have shown that, on average, family firms have higher growth rates than their non-
family counterparts, particularly in countries with better institutional environments. We shall now 
proceed to explore whether these main findings vary across different types of family firms, 
industrial sectors and stages of the business cycle iv. Results are provided in Table 9. 
 INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
 
5.2.1 Variations across family firms 
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Because studies show that different types of family involvement can affect firm dynamics and 
performance (Chrisman, Chua, Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Steier, 2017; Daspit, Chrisman, 
Sharma, Pearson, & Mahto, 2018; Memili & Dibrell, 2019), we assessed their impact on firm 
growth in different institutional environments. To this end, we re-estimated our main explanatory 
model for founders and for heirs and for their involvement in the firm management. We distinguish 
four clusters: 1) firms led by founder CEOs (Founder CEO); 2) non-executive founders (Founder 
non-executive); 3) heir CEOs (Descendant CEO); and 4) non-executive heirs (Descendant non-
executive). Results are reported in Models 1 and 2 of Table 9. 
Model 1 indicates that founder-led family firms exhibit faster growth than non-family firms 
and later-generation family firms (p<0.10), perhaps because founders are more talented, expert, 
and entrepreneurial. Interestingly, we do not find that later-generation firms have slower growth 
than non-family firms, as coefficients for Descendant CEO and Descendant non-executive are non-
significant.  
  Model 2 shows a positive moderating effect of superior institutional development only for 
later-generation family firms led by professional (non-family) CEOs (β=0.017; p<0.097). Thus, 
professional CEOs in later-generation family firms achieve superior growth only in countries with 
strong institutional environments. 
In summary, first-generation family firms, on average, demonstrate higher growth rates 
than others regardless of whether the CEO is a family member or not, whereas later-generation 
family firms achieve faster growth but only with non-family CEOs and in countries with superior 
institutional development. 
 
5.2.2 Variations across industries 
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We explored the role of Industry concentration in the relationship between family influence and 
firm growth, as captured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of segment market shares 
(Sraer & Thesmar, 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2010). Family firms might have more difficulty 
growing in industries dominated by a few powerful rivals. Models 3-6 of Table 10 display results 
for industries with low concentration (those with HHI below the median) and high concentration 
(HHI above the median). The coefficients for Family and levels of statistical significance are 
similar in both models (Models 3 and 4). A parallel result is documented for family firm growth 
in countries with different institutional environments (Models 5 and 6). Thus, industry 
concentration does not appear to affect our results. 
 
5.2.3 Variation across business cycles 
We verified whether the financial crisis of 2007-2010 influenced the results of our study 
(Minichilli, Brogi, & Calabrò, 2016) by dividing our sample into the two periods: the financial 
crisis (2007-2010) and normal economic times (2011-2016). The results are presented in Models 
(7)-(10) of Table 10. We find that the positive effect of family influence on growth is significant 
only during the normal economic period (Models 9: β=0.023, p<0.001). The Family coefficient is 
negative during the financial crisis (Model 7: β=-0.001) but does not reach significance. Thus, 
family firm growth was similar to that of others during the financial crisis. However, family firms 
operating in countries with strong institutions grow faster than non-family firms, even during the 
financial crisis (Model 8: β=0.048, p<0.000). Thus, the level of institutional development does 
matter for family firm growth in both good and bad economic times. 
To summarize, we find that family firm type and business cycle factors significantly alter 




5.3 Robustness tests 
To validate our main findings, we performed several robustness tests using alternative variable 
definitions and alternative model specifications. We re-ran our model using alternative definitions 
of our dependent variable (Panel A of Table 10) as follows: 1) Absolute growth rate in total assets 
for company i from country c between time t and t-1 (Models 1-2); 2) Relative growth rate in total 
assets for company i from country c between time t and t-1 (Models 3-4); 3) Relative growth rate 
in sales for company i from country c between time t and t-1 (Models 5-6); 4) Return on Assets 
(ROA) defined as the ratio between earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
divided by total assets for company i from country c (winsorized at the 1% level) (Models 7-8)v. 
In most of the specifications, we obtain similar results for both magnitude and direction of the 
main effects reported in Table 10. However, in a few cases they lacked statistical significance, 
perhaps because different growth measures assess different qualities (Shepherd & Wiklund, 2009). 
In addition, we re-estimated our model using an alternative family firm definition (a dummy 
variable that equals one if the founder or descendant or family member is director or large 
shareholder owning more than 5% of the firm’s equity, zero otherwise) and found strong support 
for both H1 and H2 (Models 9 and 10 of Table 10). 
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
We also re-estimated our explanatory model by including additional control variables (Panel B 
of Table 10): 1) Industry concentration estimated as the HHI (sum of squared market shares using 
segment sales at the industry level) (Models 1-2); 2) Innovation output estimated as the brands and 
patents-to-net-sales ratio (Models 3-4); 3) Public spending estimated as cash payments for 
operating activities of the government in providing goods and services (this includes compensation 
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of employees, interest and subsidies, grants, social benefits, and expenses such as rent and 
dividends) (Models 5-6); 4) Internationalization calculated as the ratio between foreign sales and 
net sales (Models 7-8); 5) Population size calculated as logarithm of country’s population (Models 
9-10); 6) All the afore-mentioned additional controls were included simultaneously (Models 11-
12).  
 
6. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The agency view and much of the SEW perspective suggest that the growth prospects of family 
firms are limited (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2014). Rationales include extraction of private 
benefits, risk aversion, lack of resources, and entrenchment of incompetent family members. By 
contrast, the long-term orientation view suggests that many family firms have long time horizons 
and invest generously in their companies; that in turn fuels their superior growth. In this study, we 
compare the ability of the agency versus long-term orientation views to explain the growth rate of 
family firms and the concomitant impact of the institutional context. 
We find that family influence does in general increase firm growth. However, this is far 
truer in countries with a sounder institutional environment; specifically, countries that are more 
democratic, have more effective governing policies, are less corrupt, and where the rule of law 
prevails. These findings hold after controlling for endogeneity and sample selection, and adopting 
alternative model specifications and control variables. We also find that the positive effect of 
family influence on firm growth varies significantly across different types of family firms and 
different business cycles. 
Our results appear to confirm the long-term orientation of many family firms. Arregle et 
al. (2007); Block and Henkel (2010); Chrisman, Chua and Steier, 2011; Miller et al. (2008); Miller 
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& Le Breton-Miller (2005; 2014) and others have argued that family firms are concerned with the 
long-term future of the business to support the careers, financial, and social circumstances of 
current and later generations. As a result, many families tend to have longer time horizons – to 
invest more in their companies than diffusely owned firms with agent executives who are pressured 
to deliver quarterly earnings and have less at stake in long-term outcomes. Such a long-term 
orientation can promote growth. 
However, where a long-term orientation is discouraged or stymied by an institutional 
climate that makes the future highly uncertain, and therefore investments in the long term less 
likely to pay off, then family firms will be less likely to invest, and their long-term growth can be 
slower than otherwise. Indeed, where the institutional environment is undemocratic, 
underdeveloped, corrupt, ineffective, or risky, families may, in line with agency expectations 
(Morck et al., 2005), extract private benefits from their public companies to build a private family 
nest egg, thereby hobbling firm growth. Under those circumstances, financial security and social 
position are more likely to reside in the family rather than the business (Björnberg, Dias, & 
Elstrodt, 2016). That is exactly what our analysis suggests vi.   
 
6.1 Theoretical implications 
Our study makes several theoretical contributions. First, we condition the principal-principal 
agency perspective by showing that family influence is on average beneficial to firm growth. We 
also show how that effect varies across different types of family firms, economies, and business 
cycles in publicly traded firms around the globe, where family firms are often of paramount 
economic importance (Barontini & Caprio, 2006; De Massis, Frattini, Majocchi, & Piscitello, 




Second, we demonstrate which national institutions boost family firm growth, showing that 
firms grow faster in countries with more democracy, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law, corruption control and political stability. We also document how the positive 
moderating effect of the institutional environment varies across different types of family firms and 
different business cycles. Thus, we highlight the importance of studying the interplay between 
micro- and macro-level factors.  
Finally, family business research has been plagued by endogeneity problems (Evert et al., 
2016), particularly the firm growth literature (Casillas, Moreno, & Barbero, 2010; Lee, 2006; 
McConaughy & Phillips, 1999; Sraer & Thesmar, 2007). We have strived to mitigate that issue 
along with sample selection bias using panel data and instrumental variable (IV) estimators. We 
also employed a battery of robustness tests to rule out alternative explanations. Thus, we provide 
solid insights into family firms growth. 
 
6.2 Practical implications 
Our study also has practical implications. Debates abound in the regulatory, business, and 
academic communities over policies to promote firm growth, worldwide (David, Albert, Mary, 
Erik, & Niels, 2015; Rubini, Desmet, Piguillem, & Crespo, 2012). We show that the institutional 
environment has an important effect on firm growth, and that this differs based on firm ownership 
and governance conditions. Policy-makers and potential investors must heed the institutional 
environment when evaluating growth potential.  
Managers and consultants in promoting family firm growth may do well to consider the 
business cycle. Growth promotion initiatives may succeed better during normal economic times; 
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conservative growth strategies may be better during financial crises. In other words, growth 
strategies could be adapted to the business cycle. 
6.3 Limitations and future research 
We also acknowledge the limitations of our work, which can present fruitful avenues for future 
research. As many other studies examining long-term orientation in family business (Le Breton-
Miller & Miller, 2006; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005), this study also does not directly measure 
long-term orientation associated with a firm’s strategic decision to grow. Nevertheless, we perform 
a wide range of sensitivity tests to rule out alternative explanations of our main results highlighting 
that the growth rate of a firm is indeed a function of family firms’ long-term orientation. Therefore, 
we encourage future studies analyzing the growth of family and non-family firms to examine the 
validity of our findings, measuring different aspects of long-term orientation (Le Breton-Miller & 
Miller, 2006). 
Data limitations prevented us from studying private family firms. Recent research suggests 
that such firms, insulated from financial markets, have more balanced temporal horizons and 
different investment strategies than listed family firms (Carney, Van Essen, Gedajlovic, & 
Heugens, 2015). Others show that private family firms can be excessively altruistic towards their 
descendants, thereby creating organizational inefficiencies (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2002; 
Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). Thus, analyzing private family firms’ growth 
dynamics will be an important initiative. We also hope that others will study organic versus 
acquisitive growth (McKelvie & Wiklund, 2010), and growth in small and medium-size firms, and 
at different stages of their development. 
Finally, family firm growth may be affected by the personal characteristics of family and 
non-family managers (i.e. education, age, professional background and etc.), as well as  
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governance qualities such as executive compensation, board of directors functioning and structure, 




Our study has examined the neglected topic of family business growth based on a sample of 5,265 
publicly traded firms from 43 countries in 33 industrial sectors from 2007 to 2016. Consistent with 
the long-term view of family business (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005, 2014; Lumpkin & 
Brigham, 2011), we find that family firms on average have higher growth rate than non-family 
firms and this positive effect is significantly stronger in countries with superior institutional 
environments. These results remain unchanged after correcting for endogeneity, accounting for 
potential sample selection problem, using alternative variable definitions, and including additional 
control variables. We also find that the positive effect of family influence on firm growth is 
stronger for family firms during normal economic times. All in all, our findings highlight that 
family influence is a significant determinant of firm growth, but the magnitude of that effect 
depends very much on the type of family business, the institutional context and the business cycle. 
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i “We have attempted to capture all family firms and their equity holdings. U.S. reporting requirements may 
cause a downward bias in our estimates of family ownership creating a bias towards zero in our testing. For 
instance, two great grandchildren of Schlumberger Limited's founder serve on the current board of directors. 
From 1992 to 1997, the aggregate ownership reported in the proxy statement of these two directors was 1.3 
percent. However, in 1998, their aggregate holdings increase to 5 percent because their mother passed away 
and they inherited an additional 25 million shares that were not previously reported in the proxy statement. 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 only requires that officers and directors and five percent owners report 
their holdings. Thus, several family members could hold 4.9 percent of the firm, not serve as an officer or 
director, and we would not capture this as family ownership. This suggests the use of a binary indicator 
variable to denote family firms.” (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a, p. 1310). 
ii Our main results do not change if we estimate our model without the GDP growth proxy to decrease any 
confounding effects associated with country-level growth. 
iii The proxy of family influence in our model is not endogenous according to the Durbin-Watson and Wu-
Hausman tests; however, we have re-estimated our explanatory model using the Heckman’s two-step 
treatment effects estimator (Heckman, 1979) with robust standard errors, where the treatment (being a 
family firm) has been modelled as an endogenous choice in all models. In the endogenous selection 
equation, family influence is predicted by Market Risk variable (defined as beta) since it affects the choice 
of ownership structure (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). This variable does not influence firm growth (the 
correlation between Market Risk and Firm Growth is not statistically different from zero). Quotation Time 
(the log number of years for which the firm has been listed) has also been included as an external instrument, 
as it is likely to have an impact on ownership structure, but unlikely to affect growth. In the endogenous 
selection equation, we also included all controls of our main model. As per our main findings, we 
documented that family firms have superior growth than non-family firms. However, as the self-selection 
parameter (Mill’s λ) was not different from zero in all the estimated models, the necessity of using the 
Heckman’s two-step treatment effects estimator has been rejected and, thus, the 2SLS estimates are reported 
in our main analysis. 
iv We have also analyzed the growth rates of family and nonfamily firms in fragile and stable countries 
using the Fragility States Index data. The results of this additional check show that family firms from fragile 
countries grow more than their nonfamily counterparts only in the presence of high institutional 
development. We thank one anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis. 
v When ROA is used as a dependent variable in the estimations, we omit the Cash flow variable from the 
vector of control variables, because these two variables are highly correlated (0.67). We thank one 
anonymous reviewer for suggesting this insightful specification of our model. 
vi Our findings contrast with those from prior studies that found family firms doing well where there is an 
institutional void (Khanna & Palepu, 2000), likely because those studies have examined only developing 









Table 1. Sample Distribution by Country 
Country Non-family firms % Family firms % Total sample % 
Australia 3.975 2.977 3.649 
Austria 0.921 0.941 0.927 
Belgium 1.305 1.795 1.465 
Brazil 1.301 0.828 1.147 
Canada 3.996 4.642 4.207 
Croatia 0.192 0.086 0.158 
Cyprus 0.042 0.173 0.085 
Czech Republic 0.226 0.112 0.189 
Denmark 1.686 0.716 1.369 
Finland 2.151 0.915 1.747 
France 3.305 6.541 4.362 
Germany 6.038 7.171 6.408 
Greece 2.130 10.406 4.832 
Hong Kong 0.967 2.778 1.558 
Hungary 0.209 0.138 0.186 
India 0.623 3.650 1.612 
Indonesia 0.661 0.509 0.611 
Ireland 0.736 0.854 0.775 
Israel 0.272 0.147 0.231 
Italy 2.100 5.937 3.353 
Japan 6.841 1.648 5.145 
Malaysia 0.460 0.311 0.411 
Mexico 0.243 0.267 0.251 
Netherlands 1.669 1.018 1.457 
New Zealand 0.356 0.181 0.299 
Norway 2.356 1.691 2.139 
Philippines 0.301 0.872 0.487 
Poland 0.619 0.440 0.561 
Portugal 0.724 0.699 0.716 
Qatar 0.218 0.000 0.147 
Romania 0.130 0.164 0.141 
Russia 1.603 0.475 1.234 
Singapore 1.385 1.536 1.434 
Slovenia 0.238 0.500 0.324 
South Africa 0.929 0.673 0.845 
South Korea 0.498 0.380 0.459 
Spain 1.983 2.278 2.080 
Sweden 4.243 2.200 3.576 
Switzerland 2.615 2.295 2.511 
Thailand 0.757 0.759 0.758 
Turkey 0.799 1.976 1.183 
USA 27.669 22.159 25.870 
United Kingdom 10.527 6.161 9.101 












Table 2. Sample Distribution by Industrial Sector (three-digit ICB codes) 
Industry Non-family firms % Family firms % Total sample % 
Aerospace & Defense 1.569 0.526 1.229 
Alternative Energy 0.925 1.268 1.037 
Automobiles & Parts 2.1 2.632 2.274 
Beverages 1.23 1.182 1.214 
Chemicals 3.996 2.347 3.457 
Construction & Materials 5.054 6.204 5.43 
Electricity 4.176 1.018 3.145 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 4.285 3.063 3.886 
Fixed Line Telecommunications 1.916 0.561 1.474 
Food & Drug Retailers 1.603 1.432 1.547 
Food Producers 4.054 4.953 4.348 
Forestry & Paper 1.113 0.233 0.826 
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 2.23 0.639 1.71 
General Industrials 2.188 2.718 2.361 
General Retailers 4.259 6.489 4.987 
Health Care Equipment 3.502 4.021 3.672 
Household Goods & Home construction 1.908 3.322 2.37 
Industrial Engineering 5.661 4.677 5.34 
Industrial Metals & Mining 3.142 2.977 3.088 
Industrial Transport 3.992 2.546 3.519 
Leisure Goods 1.159 1.053 1.124 
Media 3.414 5.497 4.094 
Mining 3.134 3.063 3.111 
Mobile Telecommunications 1.176 1.225 1.192 
Oil & Gas Producers 4.879 3.987 4.587 
Oil Equipment & Services 2.87 1.881 2.547 
Personal Goods 1.649 4.755 2.663 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 3.841 4.401 4.024 
Software & Computer Services 4.038 7.058 5.024 
Support Services 5.259 4.91 5.145 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 4.603 4.452 4.554 
Tobacco 0.548 0.138 0.414 
Travel & Leisure 4.519 4.772 4.601 
Total % 67.34 32.66 100 
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Table 3. Definition of World Governance Indicators (WGIs) 
WGI Description 
Democratic Freedom Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens 
can participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free 
media. It ranges from -1.212 (lowest democratic freedom) to 
1.738 (highest democratic freedom). 
Government Effectiveness Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service, and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. It ranges from -0.471 (lowest 
government effectiveness) to 2.437 (highest government 
effectiveness). 
Regulatory Quality Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. It ranges from 
-0.521 (lowest regulatory quality) to 2.261 (highest regulatory 
quality). 
Rule of Law Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and particularly 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. It 
ranges from -0.970 (lowest rule of law) to 2.100 (highest rule 
of law). 
Corruption Control Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as the "capture" of the state by elites and 
private interests. It ranges from -1.132 (lowest corruption 
control) to 2.446 (highest corruption control). 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Terrorism (Political Stability) 
Reflects perceptions of the likelihood of political instability 
and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. It 
ranges from -1.998 (lowest political stability and absence of 


















Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Non-family firms      
1 Firm growth 0.040 0.038 0.321 -8.023 9.234 
2 Firm size 15.615 15.258 2.700 7.675 26.175 
3 Firm age 3.819 3.970 0.951 0.000 6.215 
4 Financial leverage 0.252 0.240 0.179 0.000 2.943 
5 Cash flow 0.096 0.090 0.095 -2.346 1.120 
6 R&D  0.013 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.968 
7 WGI 0.098 0.189 0.948 -3.550 1.289 
8 Democratic freedom 1.108 1.144 0.487 -1.212 1.738 
9 Government effectiveness 1.437 1.529 0.530 -0.471 2.437 
10 Regulatory quality 1.357 1.461 0.505 -0.521 2.261 
11 Rule of law 1.453 1.627 0.597 -0.970 2.100 
12 Corruption control 1.405 1.465 0.719 -1.132 2.446 
13 Political Stability 0.625 0.643 0.529 -1.998 1.528 
14 Trade 66.643 56.468 58.929 22.106 442.620 
15 Inflation 1.789 1.615 2.326 -22.902 23.642 
16 GDP growth 0.853 1.019 2.354 -8.998 24.377 
Family firms      
1 Firm growth 0.060 0.058 0.365 -5.690 10.424 
2 Firm size 14.509 14.185 2.628 7.448 25.158 
3 Firm age 3.536 3.526 0.806 0.000 5.781 
4 Financial leverage 0.236 0.217 0.195 0.000 2.878 
5 Cash flow 0.095 0.089 0.116 -2.690 4.020 
6 R&D  0.013 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.770 
7 WGI -0.203 0.130 1.071 -3.550 1.289 
8 Democratic freedom 1.037 1.110 0.458 -1.212 1.738 
9 Government effectiveness 1.246 1.507 0.620 -0.471 2.437 
10 Regulatory quality 1.209 1.301 0.592 -0.521 2.261 
11 Rule of law 1.267 1.598 0.666 -0.970 2.100 
12 Corruption control 1.147 1.385 0.827 -1.132 2.446 
13 Political Stability 0.475 0.585 0.629 -1.998 1.528 
14 Trade 74.997 57.845 73.893 22.106 442.620 
15 Inflation 1.835 1.615 2.081 -5.205 23.642 
16 GDP growth 0.781 0.957 2.856 -8.998 24.377 
Total sample      
1 Firm growth 0.047 0.044 0.336 -8.023 10.424 
2 Firm size 15.251 14.910 2.726 7.448 26.175 
3 Firm age 3.726 3.784 0.915 0.000 6.215 
4 Financial leverage 0.247 0.233 0.184 0.000 2.943 
5 Cash flow 0.095 0.090 0.102 -2.690 4.020 
6 R&D  0.013 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.968 
7 WGI -0.000 0.184 1.000 -3.550 1.289 
8 Democratic freedom 1.085 1.134 0.479 -1.212 1.738 
9 Government effectiveness 1.374 1.524 0.568 -0.471 2.437 
10 Regulatory quality 1.309 1.453 0.540 -0.521 2.261 
11 Rule of law 1.392 1.616 0.626 -0.970 2.100 
12 Corruption control 1.321 1.411 0.765 -1.132 2.446 
13 Political Stability 0.576 0.632 0.568 -1.998 1.528 
14 Trade 69.371 56.476 64.319 22.106 442.620 
15 Inflation 1.804 1.615 2.249 -22.902 23.642 
16 GDP growth 0.830 0.995 2.529 -8.998 24.377 




Table 5. Mean Values of World Governance Indicators by Country 
Country 
Democratic  Government  Regulatory Rule of  Corruption Political  
Freedom Effectiveness Quality Law Control Stability 
Austria 1.395 1.642 1.487 1.854 1.588 1.209 
Belgium 1.356 1.510 1.282 1.425 1.559 0.760 
Brazil 0.489 -0.124 0.007 -0.073 -0.148 -0.142 
Canada 1.416 1.775 1.731 1.807 1.933 1.142 
Croatia 0.513 0.594 0.466 0.231 0.100 0.617 
Cyprus 1.043 1.340 1.198 1.082 1.044 0.550 
Czech Republic 1.016 0.953 1.126 1.018 0.350 1.017 
Denmark 1.566 1.988 1.777 1.953 2.332 0.965 
Finland 1.529 2.064 1.817 1.992 2.237 1.282 
France 1.213 1.437 1.180 1.457 1.407 0.423 
Germany 1.363 1.619 1.605 1.697 1.791 0.852 
Greece 0.815 0.478 0.635 0.585 0.009 -0.010 
Hong Kong 0.528 1.802 1.989 1.645 1.732 0.996 
Hungary 0.783 0.630 0.973 0.700 0.353 0.705 
India 0.426 -0.049 -0.397 -0.058 -0.446 -1.159 
Indonesia 0.099 -0.164 -0.208 -0.467 -0.557 -0.542 
Ireland 1.332 1.478 1.706 1.727 1.619 0.994 
Israel 0.702 1.305 1.245 1.040 0.921 -1.051 
Italy 1.000 0.392 0.813 0.397 0.129 0.451 
Japan 1.029 1.582 1.151 1.388 1.514 0.976 
Malaysia -0.399 0.978 0.685 0.502 0.226 0.128 
Mexico 0.022 0.253 0.384 -0.497 -0.618 -0.749 
Netherlands 1.532 1.789 1.797 1.864 2.053 1.010 
New Zealand 1.548 1.849 1.923 1.936 2.298 1.443 
Norway 1.660 1.872 1.596 1.966 2.194 1.254 
Philippines 0.072 0.102 -0.070 -0.411 -0.500 -1.078 
Poland 0.999 0.645 0.953 0.705 0.564 0.889 
Portugal 1.126 1.085 0.865 1.075 1.015 0.834 
Qatar -1.079 0.901 0.667 0.862 0.995 1.071 
Romania 0.434 -0.224 0.592 0.084 -0.161 0.197 
Russia -0.984 -0.339 -0.376 -0.804 -1.018 -0.895 
Singapore -0.119 2.198 2.020 1.734 2.113 1.306 
Slovenia 1.020 1.044 0.723 1.014 0.884 0.975 
South Africa 0.604 0.392 0.375 0.120 0.067 -0.042 
South Korea 0.694 1.142 0.996 1.003 0.498 0.270 
Spain 1.086 1.059 1.038 1.084 0.932 -0.052 
Sweden 1.587 1.905 1.808 1.978 2.239 1.100 
Switzerland 1.561 1.961 1.685 1.846 2.107 1.329 
Thailand -0.705 0.288 0.235 -0.131 -0.401 -1.075 
Turkey -0.228 0.290 0.325 0.019 0.007 -1.179 
USA 1.115 1.514 1.368 1.613 1.349 0.558 
United Kingdom 1.301 1.596 1.748 1.737 1.720 0.417 
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Table 6. Univariate Tests 
Panel A. Mean difference in firm growth by family influence 
 Family firms (1) 
Mean 




Difference in means 
(1)-(2) 
One-year firm growth 0.060 0.040 0.047 0.020*** 
Two-year firm growth 0.102 0.069 0.080 0.032*** 
Three-year firm growth 0.162 0.117 0.132 0.045*** 
 
Panel B. Mean difference by family influence and geographical location 
 Family firms (1) 
Mean 




Difference in means 
(1)-(2) 
Anglo-Saxon countries 
One-year firm growth 0.093 0.051 0.062 0.042*** 
Two-year firm growth 0.173 0.089 0.111 0.084*** 
Three-year firm growth 0.263 0.139 0.170 0.124*** 
European countries 
One-year firm growth 0.015 0.018 0.017 -0.003 
Two-year firm growth 0.011 0.030 0.023 -0.019 
Three-year firm growth 0.043 0.070 0.059 -0.027 
Asian countries 
One-year firm growth 0.130 0.038 0.065 0.092*** 
Two-year firm growth 0.257 0.057 0.116 0.200*** 
Three-year growth 0.411 0.088 0.177 0.323*** 
Other countries 
One-year firm growth 0.122 0.105 0.110 0.017 
Two-year firm growth 0.225 0.203 0.209 0.022 
Three-year firm growth 0.341 0.344 0.343 -0.003 
Note. This table presents the independent sample t‐tests with unequal variances on equality of means of the firm growth by family influence (Panel A) and mean firm growth 
by country and family influence (Panel B). Family firms are defined as those where the founder or descendant or family member is director or large shareholder. One-year firm 
growth is the log-difference of net sales for company i from country c between time t and t-1. Two-year firm growth is the log-difference of net sales for company i from 
country c between time t and t-2. Three-year firm growth is the log-difference of net sales for company i from country c between time t and t-3. Anglo-Saxon countries are the 
following: Australia, Canada, UK, USA and New Zealand. European countries are the following: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Asian countries are the 
following: Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand. Other countries are the following: Brazil, Israel, Mexico, Qatar, 






Table 7. Correlation Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
1 Family  1.000          
2 Firm growth 0.028*** 1.000         
3 Firm size -0.191*** 0.045*** 1.000        
4 Firm age -0.145*** -0.080*** 0.187*** 1.000       
5 Financial leverage -0.040*** -0.036*** 0.137*** 0.034*** 1.000      
6 Cash flow -0.004 0.135*** 0.096*** -0.003 -0.183*** 1.000     
7 R&D -0.005 -0.003 -0.114*** -0.051*** -0.179*** -0.078*** 1.000    
8 WGI -0.141*** -0.015* -0.203*** 0.063*** -0.113*** -0.004 0.110*** 1.000   
9 Democratic freedom -0.070*** -0.041*** -0.307*** 0.091*** -0.070*** -0.044*** 0.107*** 0.813*** 1.000  
10 Government effectiveness -0.158*** -0.008 -0.113*** 0.073*** -0.118*** 0.022*** 0.117*** 0.962*** 0.673***  
11 Regulatory quality -0.128*** -0.004 -0.269*** 0.025*** -0.120*** 0.008 0.077*** 0.949*** 0.694***  
12 Rule of law -0.139*** -0.012 -0.216*** 0.066*** -0.116*** 0.013* 0.112*** 0.977*** 0.780***  
13 Corruption control -0.158*** 0.001 -0.131*** 0.062*** -0.117*** 0.010 0.106*** 0.975*** 0.741***  
14 Political stability -0.124*** -0.024*** -0.118*** 0.037*** -0.079*** -0.041*** 0.095*** 0.874*** 0.673***  
15 Trade 0.061*** 0.026*** -0.012+ -0.067*** -0.023*** -0.044*** -0.043*** 0.157*** -0.194***  
16 Inflation 0.010+ 0.108*** 0.093*** -0.105*** -0.007 0.102*** -0.047*** -0.439*** -0.399***  
17 GDP growth -0.013* 0.144*** 0.190*** -0.032*** -0.084*** 0.115*** -0.028*** -0.060*** -0.154***  
 
 
 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
10 Government effectiveness 1.000        
11 Regulatory quality 0.921*** 1.000       
12 Rule of law 0.959*** 0.934*** 1.000      
13 Corruption control 0.962*** 0.923*** 0.954*** 1.000     
14 Political stability 0.807*** 0.780*** 0.790*** 0.820*** 1.000    
15 Trade 0.214*** 0.262*** 0.102*** 0.198*** 0.252*** 1.000   
16 Inflation -0.420*** -0.391*** -0.433*** -0.384*** -0.417*** -0.039*** 1.000  
17 GDP growth -0.023*** -0.059*** -0.050*** -0.003 -0.064*** 0.125*** 0.239*** 1.000 










Table 8. Main Results 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
D.V.: Firm growth          
Firm size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.439) (0.171) (0.249) (0.273) (0.362) (0.121) (0.191) (0.329) (0.406) 
Cash flow -0.142 -0.153 -0.159 -0.149 -0.161 -0.160 -0.164 -0.161 -0.149 
 (0.135) (0.108) (0.097) (0.118) (0.092) (0.094) (0.088) (0.093) (0.117) 
R&D 0.081 0.045 0.036 0.065 0.029 0.038 0.029 0.029 0.062 
 (0.628) (0.790) (0.830) (0.697) (0.862) (0.823) (0.864) (0.862) (0.711) 
Firm age -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.070 -0.066 -0.064 -0.067 -0.064 -0.064 -0.064 -0.063 -0.067 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
GDP growth 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.011 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.008 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.009 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.783) (0.759) (0.701) (0.570) (0.549) (0.364) (0.779) (0.603) (0.885) 
Family  0.013 0.017 0.019 0.015 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.016 
 (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
WGI  0.011 0.005       
  (0.001) (0.186)       
Family x WGIc   0.015       
   (0.004)       
DFc    0.003      
    (0.665)      
Family x DFc    0.022      
    (0.041)      
GEc     0.010     
     (0.122)     
Family x GEc     0.026     
     (0.003)     
RQc      0.015    
      (0.047)    
Family x RQc      0.022    
      (0.020)    
RL       0.012   
       (0.044)   
Family x RLc       0.023   
       (0.004)   
CCc        0.006  
        (0.203)  
Family x CCc        0.022  
        (0.001)  
PSc         -0.002 
         (0.729) 
Family x PSc         0.023 
         (0.004) 
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Z1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Z2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Z3 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Z4 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Z5 (p-value) 0.807 0.810 0.808 0.813 0.807 0.808 0.809 0.808 0.803 
Constant 0.093 0.087 0.089 0.087 0.094 0.083 0.086 0.094 0.092 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.032 
Notes: This table presents the coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) using the 2SLS regressions with HAC standard errors. N=15,393. 
WGIc is the mean-centered WGI variable. DFc is the mean-centered Democratic Freedom variable. GEc is the mean-centered Government 
Effectiveness variable. RQc is the mean-centered Regulatory Quality variable. RLc is the mean-centered Rule of Law variable. CCc is the 
mean-centered Corruption Control variable. PSc is the mean-centered Political Stability variable. Endogenous variables are the following: 
Firm size, R&D and Cash flow. Instrumental variables are the following: the second-year lagged values of Firm size and R&D, and both the 
first- and the second-year lagged values of Cash flow. All the definitions of variables are provided in the Data section.  Z1 is a Wald test of 
the joint significance of the reported coefficient. Z2 is a Wsald test of the joint significance of the industry dummies. Z3 is a Wald test of the 
joint significance of the year dummies. Z4 is a Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. Z5 is a Hansen’s J statistic.
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Table 9. Post-Hoc Analysis  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
D.V.: Firm growth           





 period: 2007-2010 
Normal economic 
period: 2011-2016 
Family   0.018 0.019 0.017 0.019 -0.001 0.003 0.023 0.024 
   (0.026) (0.015) (0.010) (0.006) (0.889) (0.748) (0.001) (0.001) 
WGI 0.010 0.007 0.004 -0.003 0.013 0.007 0.028 0.013 0.008 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.031) (0.437) (0.639) (0.001) (0.090) (0.003) (0.181) (0.027) (0.420) 
Family x WGIc    0.018  0.013  0.048  0.010 
    (0.087)  (0.018)  (0.000)  (0.090) 
Founder CEO 0.016 0.016         
 (0.089) (0.098)         
Founder non-executive 0.023 0.026         
 (0.067) (0.069)         
Descendant CEO -0.004 -0.004         
 (0.630) (0.639)         
Descendant non-executive 0.013 0.024         
 (0.221) (0.097)         
Founder CEO x WGIc  0.004         
  (0.639)         
Founder non-executive x WGIc  0.008         
  (0.479)         
Descendant CEO x WGIc  0.004         
  (0.681)         
Descendant non-executive x WGIc  0.017         
  (0.097)         
Controls (as in Table 8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.090 0.090 -0.050 -0.047 0.264 0.267 0.221 0.238 0.065 0.067 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.297) (0.329) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) (0.044) 
N 15,393 15,393 4,126 4,126 11,267 11,267 4,081 4,081 9,199 9,199 
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.032 0.060 0.061 0.030 0.029 0.075 0.074 0.002 0.001 
 
Notes: This table presents the coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) using the 2SLS regressions with HAC standard errors. Firm growth is the log-difference of net sales for company i from 
country c between time t and t-1. Family is the dummy variable that equals one if 1 if the founder or descendant or family member is director or large shareholder, zero otherwise. WGIc is the 
mean-centered WGI index. Founder CEO is the dummy variable that equals one if the founder holds a CEO role, zero otherwise. Founder non-executive is the dummy variable that equals one if 
the founder holds a non-executive role, zero otherwise. Descendant CEO is the dummy variable that equals one if the descendant holds a CEO role, zero otherwise. Descendant non-executive is 
the dummy variable that equals one if the descendant holds a non-executive role, zero otherwise. Control variables are the following: Firm size, Cash flow, R&D, Firm age, Leverage, GDP growth, 
Inflation and Trade. All the definitions of control variables are provided in the Data section. Endogenous variables are the following: Firm size, R&D and Cash flow. Instrumental variables are 




Table 10. Robustness Tests  
Panel A. Alternative definitions  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
D.V.: Absolute growth 
 in total assets 
Relative growth  
in total assets 
Relative growth  
in net sales 
Return on  
assets 
Absolute growth  
in net sales 
Family 0.017 0.018 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.007   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.273) (0.161) (0.000) (0.000)   
Family (>5%)         0.016 0.018 
         (0.003) (0.002) 
WGI -0.003 -0.005 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.011 0.005 
 (0.278) (0.105) (0.699) (0.245) (0.003) (0.380) (0.020) (0.297) (0.001) (0.164) 
Family x WGIc  0.007  0.001  0.002  0.002   
  (0.119)  (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.153)   
Family (>5%) x WGIc          0.014 
          (0.005) 
Controls (as in Table 8)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -0.009 -0.008 1.002 1.002 1.011 1.011 0.018 0.018 0.087 0.089 
 (0.611) (0.655) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) 
N 15461 15461 15461 15461 15393 15393 15350 15350 15392 15392 
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.033 0.040 0.041 -0.003 -0.003 0.135 0.135 0.033 0.033 
Notes: This table presents the coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) using the 2SLS regressions with HAC standard errors. Absolute growth in total assets is the log-difference of total assets 
for company i from country c between time t and t-1. Relative growth in total assets is the ratio of logarithms of total assets for company i from country c in time t and t-1. Relative growth in net 
sales is the ratio of logarithms of net sales for company i from country c in time t and t-1. Return on assets is the ratio between earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided 
by total assets for company i from country c. Family is the dummy variable that equals one if 1 if the founder or descendant or family member is director or large shareholder, zero otherwise. 
Family (>5%) is the dummy variable that equals one if the founder or descendant or family member is director or large shareholder owning more than 5% of the firm’s equity, zero otherwise.  
WGIc is the mean-centered WGI index. Control variables are the following: Firm size, Cash flow, R&D, Firm age, Leverage, GDP growth, Inflation and Trade (except Models 7 and 8, where we 
omit Cash flow). All the definitions of control variables are provided in the Data section. Endogenous variables are the following: Firm size, R&D and Cash flow (except Models 7 and 8, where 
Cash flow is omitted). Instrumental variables are the following: the second-year lagged values of Firm size and R&D, and both the first- and the second-year lagged values of Cash flow (except 













Table 10. Robustness Tests (Cont.) 
Panel B. Additional control variables 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
D.V.: Firm growth             
Family 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.018 0.021 0.022 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.020 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
WGI 0.011 0.005 0.012 0.005 0.011 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.014 0.009 0.012 0.005 
 (0.001) (0.186) (0.000) (0.164) (0.001) (0.311) (0.010) (0.398) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.103) 
Family x WGIc  0.015  0.016  0.020  0.013  0.013  0.017 
  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.003) 
Industry concentration -0.022 -0.022         -0.041 -0.041 
 (0.686) (0.692)         (0.451) (0.451) 
Innovation output   -0.162 -0.162       -0.180 -0.180 
   (0.105) (0.104)       (0.093) (0.092) 
Public spending     -0.001 -0.001     -0.000 -0.000 
     (0.023) (0.038)     (0.418) (0.430) 
Internationalization        0.001 0.001   0.001 0.001 
       (0.708) (0.720)   (0.660) (0.684) 
Population size         0.013 0.012 0.009 0.008 
         (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) 
Controls (as in Table 8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.089 0.091 0.096 0.099 0.138 0.141 0.095 0.096 -0.129 -0.120 -0.036 -0.014 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.012) (0.617) (0.850) 
N 15393 15393 15383 15383 14872 14872 14291 14291 15353 15353 13802 13802 
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.033 0.046 0.046 0.028 0.028 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.031 0.038 0.038 
Notes: This table presents the coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) using the 2SLS regressions with HAC standard errors. Firm growth is the log-difference of net sales for company i from 
country c between time t and t-1. Family is the dummy variable that equals one if 1 if the founder or descendant or family member is director or large shareholder, zero otherwise. WGIc is the 
mean-centered WGI index. Industry concentration is the sum of squared market shares using segment sales at the industry level. Innovation output is the brands and patents-to-net-sales ratio. 
Public spending is cash payments for operating activities of the government in providing goods and services (this includes compensation of employees, interest and subsidies, grants, social 
benefits, and expenses such as rent and dividends). Internationalization is the ratio between foreign sales and net sales. Population size is the logarithm of country’s population. Control variables 
are the following: Firm size, Cash flow, R&D, Firm age, Leverage, GDP growth, Inflation and Trade. All the definitions of control variables are provided in the Data section. Endogenous variables 
are the following: Firm size, R&D and Cash flow. Instrumental variables are the following: the second-year lagged values of Firm size and R&D, and both the first- and the second-year lagged 
values of Cash flow.  
